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In the United States, the relationship between labor unions
and employers is primarily governed by written collective bargain-
ing agreements negotiated and entered into by the parties them-
selves. These agreements are generally for a relatively short fixed
term (often three years) and are enforceable in court by either
party against the other. Among the subjects typically covered in
collective bargaining agreements are rates of pay, employee disci-
pline, seniority, sub-contracting, and union security. If a subject is
not covered in the agreement, employees generally have no remedy
under the American system.'
Over ninety percent of American collective bargaining agree-
ments provide for some form of grievance procedure, ending in ar-
bitration, to resolve all disputes over the application or interpreta-
tion of the agreement.2 Under grievance procedures, the parties
first attempt to settle any alleged contractual violations through
negotiations at successive levels of union and management.3 If they
cannot settle the dispute, it is submitted for resolution to an
independent third party arbitrator, whom they have mutually se-
lected.' The parties may, for example, select an arbitrator to settle
* B.A. Yale College 1977; J.D. Columbia University 1982. Mr. Zelek represents
management in the field of employment and labor law in Miami, Florida. He is grateful to
Terence G. Connor and Alicia M. Castilla for their assistance in the preparation of this
article.
1. M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 26 (1981).
2. The term "arbitration" as used in this discussion refers to "grievance" arbitration
only. Completely excluded is the subject of "interest" arbitration which is arbitration over
terms to be included in a collective bargaining agreement. In the United States, interest
arbitration is most common in the public sector where employees generally are not permit-
ted to strike. Typically, when the parties are unable to negotiate a satisfactory contract at
the bargaining table, an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators is empowered by statute to listen
to the parties' positions and make findings as to appropriate contract terms. See H. PERRITT,
EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE 121 (2d ed. 1987).
3. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 120 (3d ed. 1973).
4. D. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN A NUTSHELL 16 (1979).
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a dispute over the interpretation of contract language relating to
pay rates, seniority or contractual limitations on firing or other dis-
ciplinary action against an employee. Generally, the arbitrator's
decision cannot be appealed to the courts or any other government
agency."
II. ADVANTAGES OF LABOR ARBITRATION
The major advantage of grievance arbitration-and no doubt
the main reason for its widespread acceptance in the United
States-is that it enables labor and management to settle their dif-
ferences while the contract is in effect without strikes or lockouts.'
When a union agrees to arbitration, it gives up the right to strike
over arbitrable disputes. Contracts that provide for arbitration
generally contain clauses prohibiting strikes and lockouts over ar-
bitrable disputes.' Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has
held that employees violate a collective bargaining agreement by
striking over an issue which is subject to binding arbitration under
the agreement, even if the agreement does not contain an express
no-strike clause.' Thus, while a dispute is resolved through the
grievance arbitration system, work at the plant or office normally
continues peacefully and without interruption. If there is a work
stoppage, the employees involved can be disciplined, and if the
strike is supported by the union, the employer can sue for
damages.9
Grievance and arbitration procedures also guarantee that the
collective bargaining agreement's provisions will be enforced with-
out the necessity of resorting to a breach of contract suit in court.1"
As with commercial arbitration, labor arbitration is generally
quicker and significantly less expensive than courtroom litigation.
Moreover, labor arbitrators are theoretically better suited than
American court judges to resolve disputes under collective bargain-
ing agreements. Labor arbitrators are chosen by the parties, pre-
sumably because of some mutual trust both sides have in them,
and because they often have a special expertise in the practices of
5. M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, supra note 1, at 17.
6. H. PERRITT, supra note 2, at 128.
7. D. NOLAN, supra note 4, at 53-61.
8. Local 174 Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
9. M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, supra note 1, at 149, 154.
10. H. PERRITr, supra note 2, at 128.
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the industry in which the grievances arise." Thus, they are better
able to fashion a decision all sides can tolerate. This is significant
because, unlike most courtroom litigants, employers, employees,
and unions have a day to day relationship and must be able to
"live with" the judgment or award rendered.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Despite its current widespread use, grievance arbitration is a
relatively recent phenomenon in the United States. It was not gen-
erally accepted until World War II, although impartial umpires
had been used to settle disputes in certain industries since the turn
of the century."
Until the World War II, most unions strongly opposed al-
lowing an arbitrator to resolve their disputes with management.
Instead, they preferred to use strikes and picket lines to pressure
employers. Unfortunately, this often led to violent confrontations
between workers and employers and disrupted the American
economy.
In turn, many employers were reluctant to allow an outsider to
tell them how they should run their own businesses. Furthermore,
most employers believed that arbitrators would be sympathetic to
unions.
During World War II, the National War Labor Board ordered
the inclusion of grievance arbitration clauses in all labor-manage-
ment contracts."3 The Board believed that in order to prevent
strikes which would threaten the production of war materials, 4 it
was essential to have a grievance arbitration mechanism to give
employees an opportunity to air and resolve their complaints. Ar-
bitration worked very well during the war and its positive role in
the war effort was widely recognized.
IV. STATUTORY AND CASE LAW BASIS OF ARBITRATION
After the war, the United States Congress and the courts be-
gan to support labor arbitration. In 1947, the United States Con-
gress expressly declared in the Labor-Management Relations Act,
11. R. BRITTON, THE ARBITRATION GUIDE: A CASE MANUAL 57-59 (1983).
12. H. PERRITT, supra note 2, at 124-27.
13. Id. at 127.
14. R. BRITTON, supra note 11, at 2, 5.
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more commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act,15 that it favored
arbitration over strikes or litigation for resolving industrial
disputes."5
Thereafter, a series of United States Supreme Court decisions
established three basic legal principles which laid the foundation
for grievance arbitration as it exists today in the United States.
The first rule of law is that arbitration agreements are legally en-
forceable in the courts. Before this rule was adopted, problems
with the arbitration process arose when parties to collective bar-
gaining agreements containing arbitration clauses refused to arbi-
trate or ignored an arbitrator's decision. In its Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills decision," the Supreme Court held that Section 301
of the Taft-Hartley Act18 allowed a party to bring suit in federal
court to compel the recalcitrant party to submit the dispute to ar-
bitration or to force compliance with the arbitrator's decision. 9 In
deciding whether to issue such an order, the court will apply the
second and third rules of law which were established by the Su-
preme Court in three important cases that have become known as
the "Steelworkers Trilogy."'
The second rule is that, in actions to compel a party to
arbitrate, courts presume disputes to be arbitrable. The Supreme
Court has prohibited lower courts from deciding the merits of a
grievance filed under contracts with arbitration clauses and has re-
stricted them to inquiring whether the claim, on its face, is gov-
15. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
16. Section 203(d) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the applica-
tion or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement.
29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
17. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
18. Section 3 01(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
19. Comment, Unsuccessful Employee Arbitrants Bring Wrongful Discharge Claims in
State Court: the Accommodation of Public and Private Adjudication, 35 BUFFALO L. REV.
295 (1986) (authored by Michael G. Whelan).
20. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Corp., 363 U.S, 564 (1960).
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erned by the contract."' If the claim is even arguably covered by
the contract, the correct action for the court to take is to order
arbitration. A court may only decide that the dispute is not arbi-
trable if the agreement provides very strong evidence that the par-
ties intended that the claim be excluded from arbitration." The
significance of this rule is that it restricts parties to the agreement
from using the courts rather than arbitrators to decide their dis-
putes. In practice, there are very few disputes which a party can-
not force into arbitration if the collective bargaining agreement
contains a typically broad arbitration clause."
The third rule of law from the Steelworkers Trilogy is that, in
actions to force a party to comply with an arbitrator's award, judi-
cial review of the arbitrator's decision is extremely limited. A court
may not overturn an arbitrator's award simply because it disagrees
with the arbitrator's construction of the agreement or thinks that
the arbitrator did not apply correct interpretation principles. As
long as the award "draws its essence" from the collective bargain-
ing agreement, it may not be overturned or modified in any way.24
As a result of this rule, labor arbitration is final and binding. Un-
like trial court decisions, very few arbitration awards are appealed
and virtually none are actually modified by the reviewing court.
Instead, a union or an employer which strongly dislikes a particu-
lar arbitration decision will generally wait until shortly before the
agreement's expiration date and attempt to negotiate a new agree-
ment on the subject of the decision.
Beyond these three principles-that arbitration agreements
are legally enforceable, that disputes are presumed to be arbitra-
ble, and that judicial review is extremely limited-there are very
few U.S. statutes or court decisions which influence the arbitration
process. The reason for this lack of influence is that, with the sig-
nificant exception of airlines and railroads which are required to
arbitrate their disputes under the Railway Labor Act,'25 arbitration
21. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 564.
22. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 574.
23. M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, supra note 1, at 6, 25.
24. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599. See also United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987) (a court may not refuse to enforce arbitration award
on public policy grounds based on "general considerations of supposed public interest," but
only when it conflicts with some explicit public policy that is well-defined and dominant in
laws and cases).
25. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
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is largely a creature of private contract between labor and manage-
ment.
IV. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
As indicated earlier, a grievance is an assertion that the collec-
tive bargaining agreement has been violated. Although employers,
under some contracts have the right to file grievances, the vast ma-
jority of grievances are complaints by employees that the employer
is not treating them as required under the collective bargaining
agreement.2"
Probably the most common grievance is that an employee was
fired or otherwise disciplined without "just cause" as is required
under virtually all contracts.2 7 Another typical grievance is that the
employer violated seniority rights contained in the collective bar-
gaining agreement by giving promotions, assignments, and over-
time to less senior employees. Other issues which often arise in-
volve what an employee's job duties actually are, the performance
of work by employees who do not belong to the union such as su-
pervisors or salaried employees, the subcontracting of work previ-
ously performed by union employees to non-union outsiders, and
the calculation of cost-of-living payments required under the
contract.
The grievance process usually consists of three or four steps
which must occur within rigid time limits.28 As a first step, the em-
ployee or shop steward usually must notify the immediate super-
visor of the grievance within a few days of the action which
prompted the grievance." If no settlement is reached, the griev-
ance may be appealed "up the ladder" to higher levels of the man-
agement hierarchy. Depending on the agreement, a written griev-
ance may be filed either at the first step or any subsequent step."
It should be noted that in the United States the union, and
26. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 109.
27. In the United States, non-union employees generally do not have any such protec-
tion and can be fired for any non-discriminatory reason or no reason at all. Id. at 610-11. It
is noteworthy that only 13% of private sector employees in the United States are union
members. Big Labor Losing Big, and Stakes get Higher, Chicago Trib., Sept. 4, 1989, at C1,
col. 2.
28. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 146-54.




not the employee, normally controls the grievance process.3 1 The
reason for this is that the union, under the Taft-Hartley Act, is the
exclusive representative of employees. The union has the discre-
tion to determine if the grievance has merit. In an appropriate
case, the union can decide not to go forward with a grievance and
this decision is generally binding on the employee.2 An employee
whose union has declined to proceed with his or her grievance (or
which loses an arbitration) can sue the union for violating its duty
of fair representation but will win only if he or she can show that
the union acted in bad faith and that the claim was meritorious."
The fact that the union may have acted negligently or exercised
poor judgment is generally not sufficient .
3
V. THE ARBITRATOR
If a matter cannot be resolved by the union and the employer
after all the grievance steps have been exhausted, it eventually is
submitted to an arbitrator for resolution. Although most labor ar-
bitrators are lawyers, many laymen such as college professors in
economics or political science also serve as arbitrators."
The manner for selecting an arbitrator varies. In some indus-
tries arbitrators are designated in collective bargaining agreements
to hear all grievances that reach arbitration. However, under the
majority of contracts, an ad hoc arbitrator or arbitration board
must be selected by agreement of the parties for each dispute re-
ferred to arbitration. 6 This typically involves rejecting individuals
from the list of arbitrators and then choosing from the remaining
arbitrators on a list based on order of preference.3 7 As one can im-
agine, the evaluation of potential arbitrators and the selection of
the person or persons most likely to make a decision favorable to
your side is very important. In the event that the parties fail to
agree on the arbitrator within a specified length of time, most
agreements provide that an impartial agency, like the American
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967).
34. See Camacho v. Ritz-Carlton Water Tower, 786 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986).
35. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 90, 94.
36. R. BRITTON, supra note 11, at 54.
37. Id. at 64.
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Arbitration Association, will supply the arbitrator. 8
VI. THE ARBITRATION HEARING
Once chosen, the arbitrator usually communicates with the
parties to arrange a hearing. The parties normally decide on the
location of the hearing. Arbitration hearings are normally held in
such places as company offices, hotel conference rooms or lawyer's
offices, rather than courtrooms."' Present at the hearing are the ar-
bitrator or panel of arbitrators, the employer's representatives in
charge of processing grievances, and the grievant and his represen-
tative. The grievant is often represented by the union rather than
by a private attorney. For the most part, arbitrations are clo-ed to
the public.4 A court reporter is present only if requested by one of
the parties, who must then pay the cost; otherwise the arbitrator
simply takes detailed notes.
Compared with courtroom trials, labor arbitrations are very
informal.4' Often they are more like a meeting than a-trial. There
are no formal pleadings and little or no discovery.2 Thus, a lawyer
who prepares a case for arbitration often has limited knowledge of
what the other side's defense will be.
Moreover, although arbitrators preside over the hearing and
control the procedures followed, they are generally very liberal in
their application of the rules of evidence. Arbitrators are not re-
quired to observe legal rules of evidence except in the rare case
where the contract expressly provides for it.' When confronted
with an objection to the introduction of a specific piece of evidence
such as hearsay testimony, arbitrators often admit the evidence
and comment that they will "take it for what it's worth." By so
doing, they are using the rules of evidence not to determine
whether that evidence is admissible, but rather to determine the
weight it should be given." This flexible approach is probably due
to the informality of arbitration proceedings and the fact that an
38. S. CABOT, LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT MANUAL 18-4 (1978). See also Fed-
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service: Arbitration Policies, Functions and Procedures,
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) LRX 5015-18 (March 25,1985).
39. R. BRITTON, supra note 11, at 113.
40. Id. at 114.
41. Id. at 108.
42. 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 121 (1973).




arbitrator's refusal to hear all material evidence may be grounds
for a court to overturn the award.45
With the significant exception of discharge and discipline
cases, the party who submitted the grievance to arbitration, usu-
ally the union, generally must put his or her case on first and has
the burden of proof."" In discharge and discipline cases, the em-
ployer is always required to proceed first and has the burden of
proof.' 7 Arbitrators vary on the weight of this burden. Some arbi-
trators, especially where an employee is fired for activity which is
criminal in nature, such as theft, require the employer to prove
each element of the offense "beyond a reasonable doubt." Others,
however, consider arbitration to be civil in nature and therefore
proof must only be by a "preponderance of the evidence" no mat-
ter if the arbitration concerns contract interpretation or the dis-
charge and discipline of an employee.48
At the beginning of the hearing both sides are given the op-
portunity to make opening statements. 9 Thereafter, they have the
chance to present all relevant evidence and testimony. Whether
the testimony is to be given under oath is decided by the arbitrator
and the parties, however, arbitrators do have the power to admin-
ister oaths." Leading questions on direct examination are permit-
ted, although they of course limit the weight that the testimony
will be given.5 1 After direct examination, the adversary can cross-
examine the witness. Since arbitrators want to secure all the facts,
cross-examination is often not limited to matters that were
brought out on direct."2 Recross and redirect examination are gen-
erally allowed. A witness in an arbitration will rarely be cut-off and
some arbitrators even ask witnesses at the conclusion of their testi-
mony whether they want to say anything else.
After all the evidence is heard, the parties are generally enti-
tled to make closing statements.2 In many cases, the parties are
permitted to submit post-hearing briefs depending on the arbitra-
45. See Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
46. D. NOLAN, supra note 4, at 132. But see S. CABOT, supra note 38, at 18-11.
47. D. NOLAN, supra note 4, at 133.
48. Id. at 134, 135. See also S. CABOT, supra note 38, at 18-11.
49. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 224.
50. Id. at 221.
51. Id. at 226.
52. R. BarrrON, supra note 11, at 126.
53. F. ELKOURI & E ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 224.
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tor and industry custom. 4
VII. THE ARBITRATION AWARD
After the hearing is finished, the arbitrator makes a decision
by weighing all the evidence presented.55 Often, the arbitrator ac-
companies the award with a written opinion stating the reasons for
the decision. In making their decisions, labor arbitrators have
enormous discretion. Because the arbitrator derives his power
solely from the collective bargaining agreement, awards decided
under different agreements and court decisions on similar issues,
are not binding."'
Furthermore, the agreement itself usually provides little guid-
ance as to how a particular dispute should be resolved. Often, the
arbitrator is called upon to apply or interpret generalized provi-
sions such as "an employee shall not be discharged except for just
cause."57 This is not surprising since it would be virtually impossi-
ble for the parties to anticipate the wide range of disputes which
can arise in an employment relationship and probably undesirable
to even attempt to provide for them all in one written agreement.
In reaching a decision, arbitrators commonly place great
weight on how they believe the parties should act in the interest of
promoting good labor-management relations. Often, decisions
are also based on what the past practice of the parties has been
in similar circumstances. 8 In the specific context of discharge
and discipline cases, arbitrators typically consider factors such as
whether the company gave the employee previous warnings,
whether it conducted a fair investigation, how it has treated other
employees who did the same thing, and whether the "punishment"
is too severe for the act committed.5 9
The arbitrator also has wide discretion to decide what relief is
appropriate, so long as the relief is not inconsistent with the collec-
tive bargaining agreement." For example, in discharge cases, arbi-
trators will typically order the employer to reinstate the employee
54. Id. at 230.
55. Id. at 233.
56. R. BITTON, supra note 11, at 165.
57. S. CABOT, supra note 38, at 14-2.
58. R. BITTON, supra note 11, at 163.
59. H. PERRITT, supra note 2, at 129.
60. M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, supra note 1, at 20.
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and pay him for the time he missed if they conclude that the em-
ployer did not have "just cause" for the firing." However, punitive
damages or attorney's fees are seldom appropriate unless the
agreement expressly allows them.12 As noted earlier, arbitration
decisions are rarely appealed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this writer's opinion, grievance arbitration works well in the
United States. Because of arbitration, strikes which interrupt pro-
duction and paychecks are very rare while collective bargaining
agreements are in effect. Moreover, the parties secure a decision by
someone they themselves picked, much faster and for much less
costs than if they went to court. Although the losers always grum-
ble, both unions and employers are generally satisfied with the pre-
sent system.
61. Id. at 42.
62. Id. at 184, 204.
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